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BARGE OWNER LIABLE FOR OIL SPILLS
OCCURRING WHILE BARGE IS UNDER THE
CONTROL OF THIRD PARTY
TUGBOAT OPERATOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT: A barge owner who contracts with a tugboat operator to tow oil barges may not assert a third party defense under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act against claims resulting from
an oil spill. United States v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 625 F.2d 524

(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2336 (1981).
The Department of Justice instituted a civil action in the Southern
District of Texas seeking recovery under § 1321(b)(3) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972' for the costs of cleaning up
the oil spilled from a barge owned by Hollywood Marine, Inc. 2 Hollywood
Marine engaged in the business of transporting petroleum by barge in the
coastal and inland waterways of southern Texas. It contracted with Three
Jack Towing, Inc. to perform the towing of its barges. Under the terms
of the contract, Three Jack retained exclusive control of the towing operations and agreed to indemnify Hollywood Marine against all claims
for damage arising out of those operations. On August 5, 1976, a Hollywood Marine barge in tow behind a Three Jack tug sustained damage
while in the Texas intra-coastal waterway. As a result, approximately two
thousand gallons of oil spilled into the waterway. The United States Coast
Guard cleaned the spill at a cost of $61,816.85. The government sued
Hollywood Marine and its insurer, Water Quality Insurance Syndicate,
to recover the cost of clean-up.
The district court found no liability. Although § 1321(b)(3) of the Act
provides that owners of vessels which discharge oil or hazardous substances shall be liable without fault for the costs of clean-up, § 1321(f)(1)
provides a defense to liability "where the discharge was solely caused
by an act or omission of a third party without regard to whether such act
or omission was or was not negligent." The district court found that the
Hollywood Marine barge had been turned over to Three Jack in a seaworthy condition.' The court also found that the spill had occurred when
Three Jack had exclusive control of the towing operation and barge personnel.4 Hence, the court concluded that Hollywood Marine's third party
defense barred recovery by the government under § 1321(b)(3).'
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33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
United States v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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The government appealed to the United States court of appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.6 The government relied on United States v. LeBeouf Bros.
Towing Co., 7 which was decided by the Fifth Circuit subsequent to the
district court's decision for Hollywood Marine. 8 LeBeouf involved the
same issue: whether an independent contractor who operated a tugboat
constituted a third party for the purposes of a defense under § 1321(f)(1).
The court in LeBeouf narrowly construed the statute and held that the
tugboat operator was not a third party. The court of appeals found LeBeouf
controlling and therefore reversed the district court. 9
Hollywood Marine filed a petition for certiorari which the United States
Supreme Court denied on May 18, 1981.1 Justice Rehnquist alone dissented. Although Rehnquist did not find the court of appeals' construction
of § 1321(f)(1) to be "wholly unreasonable," neither did he find that such
a narrow construction was warranted by the plain language of the statute."
Rehnquist, moreover, noted a division in the circuits on the interpretation
of § 1321 (f)(1).' 2 Given such a division and the importance of the economic and environmental interests implicated, he concluded that the matter was ripe for the Court's "plenary consideration." 3
Since the balance of the Court did not concur in Rehnquist's reasoning,
the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of § 1321 (f)(1) remains intact. No "third
party" defense will lie where a spill occurs as a result of the acts or
omissions of independent contractors engaged by barge owners for towing
operations. Only the acts of vandals 4 or pilots of other colliding vessels 5
will be likely to provide such a defense.
The Fifth Circuit's narrow construction of the third party defense,
however, has distinct merit. Barge owners will not be able to escape
liability by using independent contractors. Moreover, barge owners will
be encouraged to select those contractors with the best safety records.
Fewer spills may result and, hence, water quality will be better maintained. The goals of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act are therefore
promoted by holding barge owners liable for the costs of cleaning up oil
spills.
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